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The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is widely regarded as a standard model for
the evolution of cooperation. This review tries to give an outline of the development
in the field since Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) spawned an avalanche of papers
with the announcement of Tit-for-tat as the winner of their computer tournament.
The most important advancements in the game-theoretical work on different aspects
of the game are described. It becomes evident that changing any of the numerous
parameters of the game will inevitably change the outcome; there is virtually no end
to the IPD. Using experimental data from various taxa, the applicability of the IPD
in nature is analysed and potential future developments in the area are discussed.
B. Brembs, Theodor-Boveri-Institut für Biowissenschaften (Biozentrum), Dept of
Genetics, Am Hubland, D-97074 Würzburg, Germany.
The game
"No instinct has been produced for the exclusive
good of other animals, but each animal takes
advantage of the instincts of others" (Darwin 1859).
Ever since Darwin the evolutionary success of a
seemingly obvious contradiction to his statement has
raised the interests of naturalists all over the world:
some cooperating animals are clearly mutualistic or
even altruistic. Before the 1960s only a few
scientists attempted to understand the evolutionary
processes underlying cooperation. since group
selection seemed to explain cooperative societies.
Yet. research in later years could not support a
pervasive group-benefit view of selection; how then
can cooperative genotypes spread in an environment
of selfish genes? Currently, the evolution of
cooperation can be divided into several general
categories: e.g. 1) by-product mutualism where
cooperation is an incidental outcome from genuinely
selfish behaviour (Dugatkin et al. 1992) kin-selected
altruism (Hamilton 1964) with its climax in the
social insects and 3) reciprocal altruism (Trivers
1971) among unrelated individuals. The ’Prisoner’s
Dilemma’ is used as the standard metaphor to
conceptualise the conflict between mutual support
and selfish exploitation among interacting non-
relatives in biological communities. It has yielded a
plethora of investigations concerned with a theory of
cooperation based on reciprocal altruism. The
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Prisoner’s Dilemma is a simple two-person game,
where each player (for instance two prisoners
accused of the same crime) can choose either to
cooperate (C) or to defect (D = not cooperate). Fig. 1
shows the payoff matrix: if one player defects, the
other has the option to cooperate yielding S (the
sucker’s payoff or to defect and obtain P (the
punishment for mutual defection). On the other
hand. if the opponent cooperates, one receives R (the
reward for cooperation) for a C or gains T (the
temptation to defect) for a D. Provided the payoffs
satisfy
T>R>P>S, with R>(S+T)/2, (1)
and the players meet only once, each player should
defect no matter what the adversary does, in order
not to become the ’sucker’. In a population of
interacting pairs of individuals as described above,
no single mutant adopting a different strategy can
invade and secure a foothold. Defection is the
primeval state and the only evolutionary stable
strategy (ESS; Maynard Smith 1982). However,
when played repeatedly, there is no trivial answer to
the question of how cooperation can arise from an
non-cooperative state.
Deterministic strategies
Let there be a homogenous population with
individuals that are able to recognise a previous
interactant and remember some aspects of prior
outcomes. If the average chance to meet a given
partner more than Θ times in a row is wΘ (where
0<w<1), then a strategy would be a rule, modifying
the behaviour (C or D) according to the history of
the interaction so far. Obviously, unconditional
defection (ALLD) is still an ESS against single
cooperating mutants. But there may be other stable
strategies as well. In fact, in the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (IPD) no strategy is evolutionarily stable
(Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987, Lorberbaum 1994).
Tit for tat
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) used a computer
tournament to detect strategies that would favour
cooperation among individuals engaged in the IPD.
In a first round, 14 more or less sophisticated
strategies and one totally random strategy competed
against each other for the highest average scores in
an IPD of 200 moves. Unexpectedly, a very simple
strategy did outstandingly well: cooperate on the
first move and then copy your opponent’s last move
for all subsequent moves. This strategy was called
’Tit for tat’ (TFT) and became the founder of an ever
growing amount of successful strategies. In a similar
competition with 62 contestants, TFT won again. It
has three characteristics that account for its
impressive performance: it is nice (cooperates on the
first move), retaliatory (punishes defection in the
prior move with defection) and forgiving (immediate
return to cooperation after one C of the adversary).
In an ecological analysis, the scores from round two
were used to calculate the relative frequencies of the
strategies in a hypothetical population. The
strategies were then submitted to each subsequent
round in proportion to their cumulative payoff (V) in
the previous round. In the long run, TFT
outcompeted its rivals and went to fixation (Axelrod
















where max denotes the larger of the two values in
brackets, TFT can increase in frequency in a
predominantly ALLD environment and, once
established, resists invasion of any defecting
strategy. Under these circumstances, no single
mutant can do better than TFT (TFT is "robust",
Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). Notwithstanding, there
may be "twin"-strategies, that do as well as TFT
against TFTers. Any other cooperating strategy (e.g.
"always cooperate", ALLC) can perform a ’random
walk’ through a homogenous TFT-population as they
both get the same reward R. The relative fitness of
both strategies is equal, thus the selection coefficient
s=0.
TF2T and STFT
Moreover, Boyd and Lorberbaum (1987) showed
that no deterministic (pure) strategy is evolutionarily
stable in the IPD. Consider the following line of
argument: a strategy Se is robust (or "collectively
stable", Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987) if for any
given strategy Si:
V(Se|Se)>=V(Si|Se) (3)
where V(Sm|Sn) is the payoff of individuals using
strategy Sm when interacting with individuals using
strategy Sn. Consider a randomly meeting
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needs to be satisfied. This is still the case, if for
some i, V(Se|Se)=V(Si|Se). There may be even
strategies Si, for which V(Si|Si)=V(Se|Si) and (4) still
is true. For example, the nice strategy TFT has the
same expected fitness as another nice strategy Tit for
two tats (TF2T, allowing two consecutive Ds before
retaliating) when interacting, because neither ever
defects. The relative fitness of TFT and TF2T is
dependent upon their interaction with any third
strategy. Assume this third strategy is Suspicious tit
for tat (STFT, playing D in the first interaction),
maintained at a low level in the population through
recurrent mutation (for example). For
V(TF2T|STFT)>V(TFT|STFT) TF2T can invade
TFT without random drift. If (2) holds, this is always
true because the more tolerant TF2T invokes
cooperation in STFT, whereas the retaliatory TFT
defects together with STFT. Accordingly, any
deterministic strategy can be invaded and
outcompeted by the joint effect of a "twin"-strategy
together with another strategy. Boyd and
Lorberbaum (1987) proved this general case to be
true for all w>min[(T-R)/(T-P), (P-S)/(R-S)].
Lorberbaum (1994) extended the instability proof to
stochastic (mixed) strategies as well. Depending on
the initial set of assumptions, however, there are
different types of evolutionary stability of single
strategies (Bender and Swistak 1995) or of groups of
strategies (see below) in the IPD. All of which have
to be considered before seriously testing the model.
Free Rider and Rover
Soon after these findings, it became clear that a
’mobile individual using an ALLD strategy could
exploit a population of cooperators, simply by
switching to new partners (i.e. manipulating w for its
own purposes) when the sucker ceased to cooperate
(Dugatkin and Wilson 1991, Enquist and Leimar
1993). There are three components modulating the
expected frequencies of cooperation: 1) If search
time τ is low, individuals adopting this strategy are
favoured. 2) The same is true, if the population is
large enough for new, ’naive’ individuals to be easily
encountered. 3) The average coalition duration Θ
modifies the availability of potential ’victims’: a
decrease in Θ will result in an increase in splitting of
cooperating couples which leads to single
individuals looking for new potential partners. In
order to determine the extent to which these factors
influence cooperation, Enquist and Leimar (1993)
analysed a model in which "Free Riders" (FR), an
ALLD strategy that abandons defecting partners,
occur. Analogous to (3), the stability condition for
TFT against a FR is V(TFT|TFT)>V(FR|TFT).
In an essentially infinite population, the search time
τ is assumed to be exponentially distributed (Enquist
and Leimar 1993). Fig. 2 shows the relations
between τ and Θ for which a cooperating population
is stable against a FR. For long search times the
stability condition approaches Θ>T/R. For shorter τ
the coalition time has to be even longer:
Θ>τT(τR+S) and for τ≤-S/R cooperation will never
be evolutionarily stable. (Enquist and Leimar 1993;
they used a different terminology. In their payoff
matrix P=0 and S<0). Similar results were obtained
from a slightly more intricate model by Dugatkin
and Wilson (1991). Their strategy ’Rover’ was
exploiting cooperators in a patchy environment. As
long as τ1>τ>τ2, they found Rover/TFT dimorphisms
to be stable as well. Here τ1 is the upper threshold
above which TFT is evolutionarily stable against
Rover and τ2 the lower threshold, below which
Rover sweeps to fixation (see also Feldmann and
Thomas 1987 for further conditions for
polymorphism stability).
Escaping the IPD
In order to avoid exploitation by travelling defectors,
one can imagine several countermoves: while
xenophobia or initiation rites may increase travel
cooperating individual may also try the round:
decrease each investment in cooperation and
compensate by increasing the number of
interactions, until the net gain of defection will drop
below τ. As a result, average coalition time Θ would
Fig. 2. For certain combinations of coalition time and
search time, a population of cooperating individuals cannot
be invaded by FR. The dashed line denotes the minimum
average coalition time for an IPD with T=2, R=1, P=0 and
S =-1. Redrawn from: Enquist, M. and Leimar, 0. 1993.
The evolution of cooperation in mobile organisms. Anim.
Behav. 45: 749.
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be prolonged and the system may come to lie above
the line, depicted in Fig. 2.
In Axelrod’s original definition, this would
correspond to R>T, which means that selfishness
and altruism become equivalent. Such a strategy
would have put itself outside the IPD, manipulating
the payoff matrix. If that rule also altered S>P,
defection would never pay and ALLC would be the
sole ESS (Mesterton-Gibbons 1991). The resulting
cooperative system would certainly be classified as
by-product mutualism, according to the definition by
Dugatkin et al. (1992).
Observer TFT
As another possibility, gathering information about a
future interactant could be efficient as well:
observation of a defecting individual would result in
playing D when this individual is encountered,
reducing the overall payoff to the defector. Consider
the strategy Observer tit for tat (OTFT): it is
identical to TFT when ignorant of a new partner, but
starts by defecting, if this partner was seen defecting
on another (Pollock and Dugatkin 1992). On what
conditions does OTFT outperform TFT?
Remarkably, this only occurs when w is relatively
small and the proportion of defectors is sufficiently
high. The results of Pollock and Dugatkin (1992)
suggest that OTFT only in part compensates for the
low value of w, reducing ALLD fitness by
diminishing the number of suckers: in a Rover/TFT
polymorphism, OTFT is not able to extinguish
Rover, it only decreases its frequency (Pollock and
Dugatkin 1992). The described features reflect the
insight that social controls will only be maintained if
exploitation actually poses a severe threat. As the
probability of future interaction increases, the
chance of punishing defectors increases, rendering
third-party observation superfluous.
Stochastic strategies
The last section already hinted at the vast number of
difficulties facing cooperation in a selfishly
exploitative environment if it still satisfies the
conditions of an IPD. It appears even more difficult,
if the individuals operate in a ’noisy’ environment.
Certain actions may be misinterpreted due to random
malfunctions in perception or transmission and
retaliatory individuals such as TFTers end up in a
sequence of reprisals until the next error occurs.
Generous TFT
According to Nowak and Sigmund (1992, 1993a, b)
this weakness is caused by the deterministic nature
of the strategies discussed so far. In reducing the
probability for C or D specified by the outcome of
the previous round from 1 to <1, one takes random
errors into account. For the infinitely IPD (the limit
case, w=1) the first move is irrelevant since its effect
is ’forgotten’ in the long run (Nowak and Sigmund
1992). The decision rule then consists of a point (p,
q) in the unit square, with the probability p (q) for a
C after a cooperative (defective) move of the
partner; 0<p,q<1. In this terminology TFT
corresponds to (1,0), ALLD to (0,0), ALLC to (1, 1)
and so on. In such a scenario, Generous tit for tat
(GTFT), a more forgiving strategy with q=min[l -(T-
R)/(R-S), (R-P)/(T-P)]= 1/3 is said to provide the
highest payoff (Nowak and Sigmund 1992).
Nowak and Sigmund (1992) used a similar approach
as Axelrod in his ecological tournament: 100
strategies S1 to S100 (uniformly distributed on the
unit square, equal initial relative frequencies) were
sampled, frequencies were assessed according to the
payoff of the previous round, below-threshold
strategies were discarded and the frequencies
evolved as Fig. 3 shows: initially, the strategies
closest to ALLD (0,0) feed on a large percentage of
high q suckers, and increase drastically while the
others vanish. If some of the initial strategies are
close to TFT (1, 0), however, the strategies near
ALLD will never reach fixation: the depletion of
suckers reduces the exploiters’ fitness (they now
gain mostly P) while the TFT-like strategies still
obtain R interacting among themselves and P
confronting the defecting strategies. Slowly at first
but gathering momentum, the cooperators increase
in frequency and the defectors wane. Yet, having
extinguished the ALLD-like strategies, the rules
close to TFT are superseded by a third strategy, very
close to the less severe retaliator GTFT. Due to the
noise, generated by the stochasticity of the decision
rules, the harsh retaliation of TFT proved ’fatal’ to
TFT. The possibility of forgiveness invading a
retaliatorily cooperating community has previously
been shown (Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987); however,
the simulations conducted by Nowak and Sigmund
(1992) clearly demonstrate the ’catalyser’-effect of
TFT:
"TFT’s strictness is salutary for the community, but
harms its own. [...] It needs to be present, initially
only in a tiny amount; in the intermediate phase, its
concentration is high; but in the end, only a trace
remains."
Pavlov
Extending their simulations (Nowak and Sigmund
1993a) to more complex strategies and taking not
only the opponent’s last move but also one’s own
into account, the decision rule is given by a four-
dimensional vector (p1, p2, p3, p4) for cooperating
after R, S, T and P. [e.g. TFT: (1, 0, 1, 0); Grim: (1,
0, 0, 0) after a single D of the opponent never revert
to C again].
Each of the 40 simulations was started with the
random strategy (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) and at every
100th generation (on average) a small amount of one
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of 105 randomly chosen different mutant strategies
was introduced. Mutations were limited to p1-p4; all
other parameters (i.e. w, R, S, T, P, etc.) were fixed.
The frequencies evolved according to the rules
described above. Fig. 4 shows a scenario that is
similar to that of the Punctuated equilibrium
(Eldredge and Gould 1972): rapid shifts in the
beginning, followed by an increase of defective
strategies, replaced by a short phase of stable TFT-
like dominance and finally substituted by GTFT or,
in more than 80%, of the simulations, by a new
strategy. The newcomer was close to (1, 0, 0, 1):
cooperate after R and P, defect after S and T - in
other words, stay with the previous decision after
scoring the higher payoffs R and T and switch after
S and P.
Because of its reflexive nature, Nowak and Sigmund
dubbed it "Pavlov", but corresponding rather to
operant than to classical conditioning, it should
reasonably have been called "Skinner", for example.
Anyway, Pavlov’s advantage over TFT is based on
two important features: it can correct occasional
mistakes and prevents invasion of strict cooperators
by exploiting them. In contrast to TFT, Pavlov loses
against ALLD, because it alternates between C and
D. By changing the decision rule slightly (e.g. 0.999,
0.001, 0.001, 0.995), however, this Pavlov-like
strategy is evolutionarily stable against ALLD.
A different solution: chaos
Frequential chaos
If Gould and Eldredge’s (1993) statement that
"maintenance of stability within species must be
considered as a major evolutionary problem" is also
valid for cornpeting strategies (i.e. genotypes) in the
IPD, the findings of Nowak and Sigmund (1993b)
deserve special interest. According to their
terminology, there is a set of 16 deterministic
strategies S0 to S15, representing the 16 corner-points
of the four-dimensional vector space (i.e. S0 is
ALLD, S9 is Pavlov, S10 is TFT, etc.). As in the last
simulation, noise is taken into account by replacing
1 by 1-e and 0 by e in the vectors; with 0 <e<<l, the
first round no longer matters (Nowak and Sigmund
1993b).
Fig. 3. The evolution of a set of strategies is shown. 99 strategies were randomly sampled and a TFT-like (0.99, 0.01)
strategy was added. The initial frequencies f were uniformly set to 0.01 and all subsequent frequencies evolved in proportion
to the payoff of the previous round. a) Relative frequencies after 0, 20, 100, 150, 200, 1000 generations. Strategies with very
low frequencies may disappear from this plot, although they are present in the numerical computations. b) Population
averages for p, q and payoff. See text for details. From: Nowak, M. A. and Sigmund, K. 1992. Tit for tat in heterogeneous
populations. Nature 355: 251.
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Nowak and Sigmund computed a large population
consisting of S0 to S15, fi being the relative frequency
of Si in a given generation, Vi the average payoff for
an Si player and u a tiny number of invaders.





















where fi’ denotes the frequency of Si after one
generation. Eq. (5) exhibits complex dynamics. The
frequencies may oscillate periodically or display
violently chaotic orbits. For example, around u =
0.0004, S4, S6, S7 and S12 almost perish, while the
other strategies oscillate vigorously. Only TFT
persists at comparatively high frequency, whereas
the other oscillating strategies come very close to
fi=0. But whenever f10 (TFT) is high, it is
outcompeted by a more generous strategy S11 (1, 0,
1, 1) and S9 (Pavlov), which in turn are invaded by
the parasitic S1 (0, 0, 0, I). S1 is then sacked by
ALLD-like (S0) and Grim-like (S8) rules which, as
expected, can easily be overrun by TFT (S10).
However, large e favours the domination of
defective strategies and the oscillations disappear.
In this model ALLD and Grim are the only ESSs,
but the introduction of GTFT may lead to stable
equilibria, where GTFT dominates (Nowak and
Sigmund 1993b).
Spatial chaos
As already pointed out by Axelrod and Hamilton
(1981), a cluster of unconditional cooperators can
invade an ALLD population. Consider a population
of players distributed on the squares of a chess
board. Each player interacts only with its immediate
Fig. 4. An evolutionary simulation of strategies involved in the IPD. The simulation was opened with the random strategy
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5). In each generation there is a 0.01 probability of mutation (i.e. randomising p1 and p2). The relative
frequencies were distributed according to the payoffs in the previous generation. Strategies with frequencies below 0.001
were discarded. Here, violent initial shifts are followed by the dominance of an ALLD-like mutant. At t = 92 000 a TFT-like
strategy invades and gets overrun by GTFT. As more forgiving strategies drift into the cooperative society, defective
strategies are able to invade and defection, dominated by Grim (0.999, 0.001, 0.001, 0.001) is the rule. Again TFT invades
and is superseded, this time by the Pavlov-like (0.999, 0.001, 0.007, 0.946). This persists until t = 107 (not shown). The
figure shows the average population payoff. the total number of strategies and the population averages of p1 through p4. See
text for more details. From: Nowak, M. A. and Sigmund, K. 1993. A strategy of win-stay lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-
tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Nature 364: 57.
Oneighbours, obeying the parameters of the single-
shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the next generation, the
square is inhabited by the player who scored the
highest total: neighbour or previous owner.
Obviously, a single cooperator perishes, but just four
cooperators in a cluster can get a foothold, since
each interacts with more cooperators than a defector
can reach. Nowak and May (1992) used cellular
automata to simulate the spatial distribution of
ALLD and ALLC ’territories’ in a population.
Surprisingly, their analysis of this simple
deterministic model, with no memories among the
contestants and without any strategical refinement,
revealed spatial chaos: unpredictably everchanging
spatial patterns of ALLD and ALLC neither
vanishing.
In addition, Fig. 5 demonstrates that for certain
parameters the frequencies are converging towards
asymptotic fractions fC (and fD=1-fC, respectively).
In spite of the stable relative frequencies, the chaotic
fluctuations of the dynamic fractal last.
Where is the Prisoner’s Dilemma
found in nature?
In the last decade, the amount of game-theoretical
literature on various aspects of the IPD has increased
considerably. For most scientists the IPD has
become something like a ’theoreticians’ playground’
with at times very little relation to empirical
observations. Evidence of the mere existence of an
IPD in biological societies is scarce, not only due to
the difficulties in measuring the essential parameters
but, as will be shown, also owing to the limited
scope of the IPD. In this section I will try to relate
some empirical work from different taxa to the
theoretical findings described so far.
Myrmecophily
One of the most recent attempts to investigate the
structure underlying interspecific mutualism was
performed by Leimar and Axén (1993). They
studied the interaction of lycaenid butterfly larvae
with ants. The caterpillars of many lycaenid species
have a 'dorsal nectar organ', an exocrine gland that
secretes a liquid containing carbohydrates and free
amino acids. The ants harvest the liquid and in turn
provide the larva with protection (see Pierce 1987
for more detailed information on the characteristics
of this relationship). Since the sweet substance is
costly to produce (Pierce 1987, Leimar and Axtén
1993), the larva would profit from obtaining ant
attendance without releasing any liquid. On the other
hand, ants may profit from harvesting the food
rewards instead of defending the caterpillar. So both
would do better defecting and thus T > R > P > S.
The results from Leimar and Axén (1993) suggest
that the caterpillars do respond to ant attendance, i.e.
retaliate. Furthermore, w might be sufficiently high,
since the butterfly larvae never leave their host
plants (Pierce 1987). However, there are several
differences to the classical IPD: 1) The rewards to
the players are asymmetrical. 2) The moves are not
necessarily simultaneous. 3) The decision rules are
influenced by a third party: predators and parasitoids
attacking the larva (Leimar and Axtén 1993). 4) The
investments in each interaction can be varied
gradually (Leimar and Axén 1993). 5) Individual
recognition is not likely between lycaenids and ants
(Pierce 1987).
Hence the structure of lycaenid-ant interaction
seems to resemble an IPD, but it is presumably more
complex.
Predator inspection in fish
Probably one of the most often analysed phenomena
in terms of the IPD, but also the most debated one is
predator inspection in shoaling fish. When a
predator is stalking a shoal of minnows (Phoxinus
phoxinus), guppies (Poecilia reticulata) or
sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus), individuals
will separate from the shoal, swim tentatively
towards the predator until only a few body lengths
away, wait there for a few seconds and then slowly
return to the shoal. It has been suggested that in such
visits the fish can gather information about the
identity, precise location and current motivational
state of the predator (Milinski et al. 1990, Reboreda
and Kacelnik 1990, Dugatkin and Alfieri 1991,
Dugatkin 1991a, b, Turner and Robinson 1992).
Two fish will approach the predator more closely
than will single fish, so they both obtain the same
benefit b and share the cost c(R=b-c/2). If one fish






aig. 5. The frequency of ALLC within the dynamic
ractal generated by a single ALLD invading an ALLC
opulation. (See Nowak and May 1992 for colour
ictures of ’fractal kaleidoscooperation’). Redrawn from:
owak, M. A. and May, R. M. 1992. Evolutionary games
nd spatial chaos. - Nature 359: 827.IKOS 76:1 (1996) 20
21 OIKOS 76:1 (1996)
information without the cost (T=b) while his sucker
takes all the risks (S=b-c; Dugatkin and Alfieri
1992). If neither of them inspects, c and b are zero
(P=0). If c>b one condition for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma is satisfied: T>R>P>S (Dugatkin and
Alfieri 1991). Moreover, it is suggested that guppies
(e.g. Dugatkin and Alfieri 1991) and sticklebacks
(e.g. Milinski 1990) are capable of recognising
previous defectors/cooperators, thus fulfilling
another condition of the IPD.
Yet, there is no case study proving that all
conditions are satisfied (Milinski 1992) and hence
all experimental results are intensely debated (e.g.
Milinski 1990, Lazarus and Metcalfe 1990,
Reboreda and Kacelnik 1990, Dugatkin 1991b,
Turner and Robinson 1992, Milinski 1992). An
alternative way would be to assume the conditions
for an IPD are fulfilled and predict the fishes’
behaviour as specifically as possible. Assuming the
fish use TFT, they must display the three
characteristics associated with TFT: nicety,
retaliation and forgiveness. Despite the problems
translating these features into measurable,
behavioural traits, Dugatkin (1991a) claims that his
data support the use of TFT in guppies. His results
indicate that guppies are ’nice’ by beginning their
initial inspection at about the same point in time,
’retaliatory’ by turning back and making a fish that
lagged to far behind (i.e. defected) the closest to the
predator (i.e. defecting the defector) and ’forgiving’
by sticking close to the former defector if he in turn
now is approaching the predator. (See Dugatkin and
Alfieri 1992 for similar results).
However, as already pointed out, the outcomes are
debatable, since there is a lack of sufficient
unambiguous evidence that fish do prefer to inspect
in pairs (Turner and Robinson 1992). Moreover, if
the knowledge gathered by inspecting fish is
transferred to their non-inspecting shoalmates, as is
commonly agreed upon, why should inspectors bear
the cost of inspection but share the benefits
(Dugatkin 1992)? How related are shoalmates with
each other? Further experiments are needed to
decide whether the IPD is an applicable model for
predator inspection in fish.
Egg-trading in simultaneous
hermaphrodites
Studying seabasses (Serranidae) may reduce
measurements that help determine whether Axelrod’s
payoff matrix is satisfied. In these shallow water
fishes, simultaneous hermaphroditism is a common
feature (Fischer 1988, Conner 1992). They are
known to be obligate outbreeders with external
fertilisation and planktonic eggs. Such a system
almost certainly prevents kin selection (Fischer
1988). During mating, each individual divides its
clutch of eggs into parcels and, subsequent to
courtship displays, alternates with its mate in
offering parcels of eggs for fertilisation.
Owing to anisogamy, producing eggs is probably
more costly than producing sperm. Thus the
’temptation to defect’ i.e. fertilising eggs without
giving any to be fertilised, is presumably high. Why
do serranids still cooperate? Fischer (1988)
suggested the fishes were using TFT and the system
would apply to an IPD. However, there are several
contradictions to this hypothesis: Fischer himself
already pointed out (1988) that by dividing the
clutches into a large number of parcels, the benefit b
(i.e. T) of fertilising a parcel of eggs is small. He
also remarked that defection consists of the absence
of an act. i.e. failure to offer eggs, rather than a
specific behaviour. In his experiments (Fischer
1988) he referred to retaliation as waiting
"significantly longer to release a batch of eggs than
[...] if the partner did reciprocate". This is an
obvious violation of the TFT rule. He concluded that
the fish were playing a nicer version of TFT e.g.
TF2T or GTFT. Yet, considering the evolution of
the mating system, Connor (1992) proposed that an
alternative explanation for cooperation in seabasses
is more likely. It was suggested that simultaneous
hermaphroditism evolved originally at a low density
of conspecifics where this reproductive system has
an advantage (Fischer 1988, Conner 1992). At that
time the clutches were not parcelled. Changing
ecological conditions increased the abundance of
mates and parcelling appeared initially because it
extended male mating success (Fischer 1988): a
parcelling individual in a population of non-
parcellers would therefore obtain more eggs from
additional matings. Once parcelling became
common, the seabasses found themselves in an IPD
(Fischer 1988), possibly susceptible for a cheating
strategy such as FR or Rover. Further decreasing
each investment may ultimately have led to R>T
(Connor 1992) and thus the system escaped the IPD.
This still remains to be tested.
If Conner’s model applies, both individuals will
cooperate until the last move, until there is only one
parcel left. Not. offering this parcel will favour the
withholding of the parcel on the penultimate move
and so on. In Serranid seabasses, short spawning
periods prevent cheating on the last move, as eggs
must be spawned on the same day they are produced
or they will become inviable. Since the chance of
finding a new mate late in the spawning period is
low, it is better to get its eggs fertilised than not to
mate at all (Fischer 1988, Conner 1992). Moreover,
Lima (1989) reported that cooperation may be stable
in a finite IPD whose end point is known to all
players.
Blood-sharing in vampire bats
Scientists working on cooperation among vampire
bats (Desmondus rotundus) face the same
difficulties in measuring all the essential parameters,
but are in a somewhat better position. Some 8’%, of
adult vampire bats fail to find food on any given
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night (Wilkinson 1984), but on such nights without a
blood meal they are often fed by successful
roostmates. This behaviour is vital for the recipients,
since their energy budget leaves them 48-72 h of
food deprivation before starvation (McNab 1973).
Wilkinson (1984) showed that food sharing by
regurgitation of blood "depends equally and
independently on degree of relatedness and an index
of opportunity for reciprocation". He suggested that
w is probably high enough to fit the IPD due to the
long lifespan of the individuals and the stable
composition of groups in which the average
coefficient of relatedness is comparatively low
(0.08-0.11; Wilkinson 1988). Fig. 6 shows that b>c
because the exponential postfeeding weightless
enables a donor to lose less time to starvation by
regurgitation of blood than the recipient gains.
Hence, it is plausible that T>R>P>S. Furthermore,
the cognitive abilities of vampire bats appear to be
sufficiently well-developed to guarantee recognition
of cooperators and defectors (Wilkinson 1984).
While it is reported that bats do in fact deny feeding
those roostmates that refused to regurgitate
previously (i.e. act retaliatorily; Wilkinson 1984), it
still remains to find out which strategy the bats
actually use. An applicability of the IPD should be
confirmed by further investigations.
Reciprocal altruism in primates
While struggling to understand the evolution of
cooperation throughout the different taxa, one of the
most intricate tasks is to study cooperation in
primates. Packer (1977) was the first to report
reciprocal altruism among male olive baboons
(Papio anuhis). The formation of short-term
coalitions among adult male P. anuhis during
aggressive interaction against a single adversary is
initiated by one male enlisting a partner and
completed by subsequently fighting the opponent.
Packer found considerable evidence that individuals
who join an enlisting baboon have previously
succeeded in enlisting that very same individual,
suggesting cooperation may be partly based on
reciprocity (Packer 1977). Determining costs and
benefits is extremely difficult, since the payoff
matrix may vary according to the different
circumstances under which coalitions are formed
(e.g. the strength of the opponent specifies the costs,
while the cause of the aggression specifies the
benefits). However, assuming that most of the
coalitions were formed to take over an oestrous
female and that the wounds received were non-fatal,
the resulting sired offspring would be a greater
benefit than the less costly wounds received in a
number of consecutive ’plays’ if both partners
reciprocated in aiding each other (Packer 1977).
But since only one of the cooperating partners
(usually the enlisting male) obtains the female at
issue, two coalitions make a ’game’. This case is at
best the alternating variant of the simultaneous IPD,
recently investigated by Nowak and Sigmund
(1994). Noë (1990) argued that this form of delayed
reciprocity is better explained with a 'Veto game'
that includes information exchange, partner-choice
and partner competition. The ability of primates in
trading different beneficial acts for other behaviour
supporting the benefactor, further complicates the
matter. Seyfarth and Cheney (1984) looked at
coalition-forming in female vervet monkeys
(Cercopithecus aethiops) in relation to preceded
grooming. Their data seem to support the view that
vervets are more apt to help an enlisting, unrelated
individual if they have been groomed by those
individuals in the recent past (Seyfarth and Cheney
1984). However, due to the complexity of
exchanging acts in various currencies (especially if
more than two behaviours are involved) and due to
the difference in hierarchical rank that breaks the
symmetry of the game, quantification of costs and
benefits seems unlikely to be possible (Noë 1990).
Therefore, all results obtained in studies as the two
described above will be persistently disputed (e.g.
Noë 1990, Hemelrijk 1991, Seyfarth 1991).
Conclusion
Cooperation is found in most taxa. One has to keep
in mind, that cooperation never was a goal but rather
a better solution than others to problems that
undoubtedly occurred frequently during the
evolution of life. Why?
On the foregoing pages I tried to draw a short sketch
of the current state of research on the evolution of
cooperation. As we have seen in the first four
sections, this interest in the evolution of cooperation
has led to independent theoretical work on the IPD
for its own sake. An outstanding performance of
Fig. 6. Predictive curve of post feeding weightlosses in
vampire bats (Desmondus rotundus). A donation of 5%
of pre-feeding weight when at weight D should cause a
donor to lose C hours but provide the recipient at weight
H with B hours. B >C for all E > F. See text for details.
Redrawn from: Wilkinson, G. S. 1984. Reciprocal food
sharing in the vampire bat. Nature 308: 183.
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theorists in the last decade has provided us with a
large number and diversity of papers investigating or
elaborating theoretical concepts within the IPD-
framework. Nevertheless, "our understanding of the
evolution of cooperation is at such an elementary
stage as to suggest that additional paradigms remain
to be developed" (Bull and Rice 1991). That hitherto
no biological system could be found in which all the
conditions for an IPD were met, clearly demands
new approaches, which will be more readily testable.
In more general models, random mutations might
provide its bearers with traits that could change
environmental, physiological and developmental
parameters. Environments, selection pressures or
mutation rates are neither fixed nor imposed,
inaccessible to evolution, but rather highly dynamic
variables. I agree with Dugatkin et al. (1992) and
Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin (1992) that "it is
time for the theoretical work to go beyond the [...]
IPD" towards paradigms that include reciprocal
altruism, by-product mutualism and other potential
categories of cooperation between nonrelatives. The
aim, of course, is to combine such new paradigms to
a model, that would provide a powerful tool to
investigate, under which precise conditions, which
forms of cooperation could evolve.
Assume that an observed behaviour corresponds to
one solution of the game. Then, one can try to find
the conditions under which this observed behaviour
is evolutionarily stable. In this context, the stability
question can be put at several levels: the stability of
single strategies (Lorberbaum 1994), the stability of
relative frequencies in an ensemble of strategies
(Feldmann and Thomas 1987), the stability of
oscillations in these frequencies (Nowak and
Sigmund 1993b), etc. The construction of such a
general model would eliminate several weaknesses
of the IPD as well (Dugatkin et al. 1992, Mesterton-
Gibbons and Dugatkin 1992): 1) It would allow the
exchange of information between the interactants.
Only few higher species ignore signals (of
willingness to cooperate or threat to break the
partnership) from their opponents during interaction
(see Noë 1990 for a model including information
exchange). 2) It would allow to change the
geometric probability distribution of Θ from
Prob(Θ)= wΘ-1 to a behaviour dependent distribution.
The formation of preference between successful
partners will certainly flatten the steep decline of
Prob(Θ) with Θ (see Feldmann and Thomas 1987,
Noë 1990). 3) While the IPD models the
maintenance of cooperation fairly well, it still fails
to elucidate the origin of cooperation from an asocial
state (see Feldmann and Thomas 1987). 4) In the
IPD, there are only two choices: C or D.
Corresponding punishment of different nuances of
defection seems more realistic (see Clutton-Brock
and Parker 1995 for the role of punishment, and
Leimar and Axén 1993 for a discussion on gradually
reactive behaviour). 5) A new model would enlarge
the scope to N-player games (see Dugatkin 1990,
Noë 1990) in order to model the evolution of social
groups.
However, evolution is a historical process (see also
Quenette and Gerard 1993) acting on a dynamical
landscape, producing unique solutions to each new
problem. Simulations of evolution should also be
expected to have different outcomes for every run.
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